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EMOTIONAL	JUSTIFICATION	Santiago	Echeverri	University	of	Geneva		 Theories	 of	 emotional	 justification	 investigate	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	emotions	are	epistemically	justified	or	unjustified.	I	make	three	contributions	to	 this	 research	program.	 First,	 I	 show	 that	we	 can	 generalize	 some	 familiar	epistemological	concepts	and	distinctions	to	emotional	experiences.	Second,	I	use	these	concepts	and	distinctions	to	display	the	limits	of	the	‘simple	view’	of	emotional	 justification.	On	 this	 approach,	 the	 justification	 of	 emotions	 stems	only	from	the	contents	of	the	mental	states	they	are	based	on,	also	known	as	their	 cognitive	 bases.	 The	 simple	 view	 faces	 the	 ‘gap	 problem’:	 If	 cognitive	bases	and	emotions	(re)present	their	objects	and	properties	in	different	ways,	then	cognitive	bases	are	not	sufficient	to	justify	emotions.	Third,	I	offer	a	novel	solution	to	the	gap	problem	based	on	emotional	dispositions.	This	solution	(1)	draws	 a	 line	 between	 the	 justification	 of	 basic	 and	 non-basic	 emotions,	 (2)	preserves	 a	 broadly	 cognitivist	 view	 of	 emotions,	 (3)	 avoids	 a	 form	of	 value	skepticism	 that	 threatens	 inferentialist	 views	 of	 emotional	 justification,	 and	(4)	 sheds	 new	 light	 on	 the	 structure	 of	 our	 epistemic	 access	 to	 evaluative	properties.		























































































































5. Solving	the	Gap	Problem			 The	gap	problem	has	three	roots:			 1) The	claim	that	emotions	provide	epistemic	access	to	the	evaluative	properties	of	their	intentional	objects.	2) The	claim	that	emotions	are	grounded	in	other	mental	states	or	episodes	that	represent	the	intentional	objects	of	emotions	in	a	non-emotional	way.																																																										25	My	point	is	not	that	the	account	of	how	emotions	are	grounded	in	representations	with	low-level	contents	cannot	be	given;	it	is	rather	that	it	has	not	been	given.	It	is	only	after	having	provided	the	account	that	perceptual	theorists	may	claim	to	have	solved	the	gap	problem.		
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3) The	claim	that	some	emotions	are	immediately	justified	in	the	weak	sense	of	borrowing	their	justification	from	their	cognitive	bases	alone.		One	might	want	to	reject	one	of	these	assumptions.	I	want	to	preserve	cognitivism	because	I	am	not	aware	of	any	alternative	characterization	of	the	epistemic	role	of	emotions	that	is	both	plausible	and	well	worked	out.	I	also	find	it	uncontroversial	that	emotions	are	grounded	in	other	mental	states	or	episodes	that	represent	the	intentional	objects	of	emotions	in	a	non-emotional	way.	Thus,	I	will	modify	assumption	3:	it	is	true	that	some	emotions	are	more	immediately	justified	than	others.	This	claim	is	particularly	plausible	in	the	case	of	basic	emotions,	which	are	processed	in	subcortical	areas	that	are	informationally	encapsulated.	Nevertheless,	it	is	a	mistake	to	hold	that	those	emotions	borrow	their	justification	from	their	cognitive	bases	alone.	My	suggestion	is	to	rethink	the	way	in	which	emotions	are	grounded.	Roughly,	emotions	are	manifestations	of	emotional	dispositions.	These	emotional	dispositions	are	keyed	to	some	non-evaluative	properties	that	are	given	to	us	via	the	cognitive	bases	of	emotions.	Other	things	being	equal,	if	the	agent	is	aware	of	the	instantiation	of	these	non-evaluative	properties,	she	will	respond	emotionally	to	the	intentional	object.	Thus,	our	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties	results	from	the	interplay	of	cognitive	bases	and	emotional	dispositions.	Emotional	responses	are	the	synthesis	of	these	two	sources.	My	proposal	is	that	we	can	exploit	this	psychological	structure	to	capture	the	distinction	between	the	justification	of	basic	emotions	and	the	justification	of	more	sophisticated	emotions.26	Crucially,	the	appeal	to	emotional	dispositions	dispels	some	of	the	mystery	that	surrounds	our	epistemic																																																									26	I	will	try	to	solve	the	problem	of	propositional	emotional	justification	by	reflecting	on	the	psychological	structure	of	emotional	responses.	This	view	is	available	to	anyone	who	holds	that	attitudinal	justification	is	more	fundamental	than	propositional	justification.	See	footnote	8.	
Forthcoming	in	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	
	 32	
access	to	evaluative	properties.	Thus,	even	if	one	is	attracted	by	a	perceptual	account,	one	ought	to	introduce	emotional	dispositions	into	the	structure	of	emotional	justification.	I	propose	to	develop	these	two	points	by	reflecting	on	a	concrete	example.27		Consider	three	different	situations:		
Situation	1:	You	are	seeing	a	gorilla	in	the	zoo.	Believing	that	it	is	safely	behind	the	bars,	you	form	the	judgment:	‘That	gorilla	is	dangerous’.	
Situation	2:	You	suddenly	realize	that	the	door	to	the	cage	has	been	left	open.	This	has	an	immediate	impact	on	your	evaluation.	You	move	from	the	initially	cold	evaluative	judgment	to	feeling	fear	of	the	gorilla.	
Situation	3:	Your	friend	Peter	has	worked	in	the	zoo	for	many	years.	He	fed	the	gorilla	when	its	mother	abandoned	it	and	has	been	feeding	it	since	then.	When	Peter	suddenly	realizes	that	the	door	to	the	cage	has	been	left	open,	he	stays	calm	but	rushes	to	close	it.	‘The	gorilla	is	dangerous…	someone	might	be	injured’,	he	thinks.28			 Goldie	has	used	similar	examples	to	defend	the	claim	that	emotions	represent	objects	under	de	se	modes	of	presentation.	We	can	use	our	examples	to	defend	a	different	claim.	In	the	three	situations,	the	cognitive	basis	(visual	perception)	provides	the	subject	matter	of	all	the	evaluations.	All	these	evaluations	are	about	the	gorilla.	Nevertheless,	there	are	crucial	differences.	Whereas	you	are																																																									27	Dispositions	have	also	figured	in	the	work	of	some	perceptual	theorists,	including	D’Arms	and	Jacobson	(2010),	Goldie	(2007),	Jacobson	(2005),	McDowell	(1985,	1987),	and	Roberts	(2003).	They	either	invoke	them	as	existence	conditions	of	emotions	or	as	parts	of	a	theory	of	evaluative	judgment.	My	contribution	is	the	introduction	of	dispositions	to	solve	the	gap	problem,	which	arises	for	emotional	justification.		28	The	cases	are	inspired	from	Goldie	(2000:	61),	who	developed	them	on	the	basis	of	similar	examples	from	Perry	(1979).	See	also	Döring	(2007:	373).	
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disposed	to	feel	fear	of	the	gorilla	(Situation	2),	your	friend	is	not	disposed	to	feel	fear	of	the	gorilla	(Situation	3).	Situations	1	and	2	are	different	too.	Your	disposition	to	feel	fear	of	the	gorilla	is	keyed	to	some	features	of	the	situation.	In	this	case,	your	noticing	that	the	door	to	the	cage	has	been	left	open	triggers	the	fear	experience.		 I	propose	to	think	of	our	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties	on	the	model	of	Situation	2.	Situation	2	lends	credibility	to	the	claim	that	the	emotional	response	is	grounded	in	its	cognitive	basis	and	an	emotional	disposition.	The	emotional	disposition	explains	why	you	do	not	feel	fear	in	Situation	1.	In	that	case,	you	did	not	represent	a	triggering	condition	of	your	disposition	to	feel	fear	of	gorillas.	This	also	explains	the	difference	between	you	and	Peter.	Peter	has	a	slightly	different	emotional	disposition;	that	is	why	he	can	issue	a	cold	evaluation.	Crucially,	the	proposed	view	dispels	some	of	the	mystery	lurking	in	our	access	to	evaluative	properties.	Your	emotional	disposition	is	not	directly	triggered	by	the	perception	of	danger,	as	if	you	had	an	arcane	sense	that	is	put	into	operation	by	the	detection	of	instances	of	danger.	Your	emotional	disposition	is	rather	triggered	by	a	non-evaluative	property	of	the	door	(being	left	open).	There	is	no	inherent	difficulty	in	understanding	how	we	could	have	epistemic	access	to	that	property.	Thus,	the	proposed	approach	also	indicates	how	we	can	improve	upon	perceptual	accounts	of	emotions.	The	property	<The	door	to	the	cage	being	left	open>	signals	the	dangerousness	of	the	gorilla	in	that	situation.	Thus,	emotions	stand	in	at	least	two	sorts	of	grounding	relations	with	their	cognitive	bases.	First,	cognitive	bases	provide	the	emotions	with	their	intentional	objects.	Second,	they	deliver	representations	of	properties	that	signal	the	instantiation	of	the	evaluative	
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properties	that	figure	in	the	correctness	conditions	of	the	corresponding	emotions.29	Consider	now	the	concept	of	justification	as	permissibility.	The	gap	problem	relies	on	the	intuition	that	we	are	not	permitted	to	jump	to	conclusions.	This	gap	is	absent	from	deductive	transitions.	Why	is	the	transition	from	p,	<if	p,	then	q>	to	q	permitted?	Part	of	the	answer	is	that	q	seems	follow	from	p	and	<if	p,	then	q>.	In	other	words,	q	seems	to	be	contained	in	p	and	<if	p,	then	q>.	We	cannot	avail	ourselves	of	the	concept	of	logical	consequence	in	the	context	of	ampliative	transitions,	i.e.	transitions	where	the	content	of	the	end	state	goes	beyond	the	content	of	the	initial	state.	Nevertheless,	we	have	something	similar	at	our	disposal.	Consider	the	case	of	perceptual	recognition.	Intuitively,	expertise	is	a	way	of	achieving	phenomenologically	seamless	transitions,	i.e.	transitions	that	strike	us	as	‘obvious’	from	the	first-person	perspective.	The	perceptual	judgment	‘this	is	a	canary’	is	reasonable	by	the	ornithologist’s	lights	because	she	can	seamlessly	move	from	the	detection	of	the	low-level	properties	of	some	birds	to	the	recognition	of	those	birds	as	canaries.	For	the	ornithologist,	a	bird	with	such	and	such	low-level	properties	is	a	canary.	The	very	same	transition	does	not	seem	obvious	to	me.	Since	I	cannot	tell	a	finch	from	a	canary,	I	am	aware	of	a	gap	between	my	perception	of	those	same	low-level	properties	and	different	possible	categorizations	of	the	bird.	Thus,	I	would	have	to	make	a	guess	or	inference	to	categorize	the	bird.	The	suggestion	is	that	these	phenomenological	considerations	
																																																								29	The	proposed	view	differs	from	Prinz’s	(2004),	who	thinks	of	emotions	as	bodily	feelings	that	have	the	function	of	indicating	the	instantiation	of	core	relational	themes.	In	my	view,	it	is	not	bodily	feelings	but	rather	properties	of	the	situation	that	signal	the	instantiation	of	formal	objects.	These	properties	should	bear	some	salient	relation	to	the	intentional	object.	In	the	case	at	hand,	I	am	afraid	of	the	gorilla.	My	fear	is	directed	at	the	gorilla	because	I	detected	a	property	that	bears	a	close	relation	to	it:	the	door	to	its	cage	being	left	open.	I	am	therefore	compelled	to	ascribe	a	different	role	to	bodily	feelings.	My	hypothesis	is	that	bodily	feelings	enable	us	to	regulate	our	emotions	and	self-ascribe	them.	
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are	not	accidental.	Expert	birdwatchers	have	achieved	high	reliability	in	bird	recognition.	This	high	reliability	is	reflected	in	the	phenomenology	of	perceptual	recognition,	i.e.	in	how	expert	birdwatchers	experience	the	transition	from	the	representation	of	low-level	properties	to	the	representation	of	high-level	properties.30		Something	similar	occurs	in	our	most	basic	emotional	responses.	Presumably,	our	basic	emotional	dispositions	have	been	developed	through	long	evolutionary	processes	in	relatively	stable	environments.	Some	of	these	emotional	dispositions	can	also	be	shaped	and	modified	through	learning,	therapy	or	habit	(as	in	Situation	3).	Once	we	are	endowed	with	the	relevant	dispositions,	the	emotional	responses	they	ground	are	permitted	from	the	first-person	perspective.	If	you	have	the	emotional	disposition	that	grounds	your	fear,	you	cannot	even	raise	the	Moorean	question:	‘But	is	it	true	that	the	gorilla	is	dangerous?’	There	is	no	phenomenal	gap	between	your	awareness	of	the	gorilla	in	a	non-emotional	way	and	your	awareness	of	the	gorilla	in	an	emotional	way.	You	seamlessly	move	from	your	perceptual	representation	of	the	gorilla	to	an	emotional	experience	of	fear	of	the	gorilla.	You	seamlessly	move	from	perception	to	the	action	tendencies	that	characterize	fear.	Deonna	and	Teroni	(2012:	80)	capture	this	point	in	an	insightful	way:	“[you]	feel	the	way	[your]	body	is	poised	to	act	in	a	way	that	will	contribute	to	the	neutralization	of	what	provokes	the	fear”.	Similarly,	when	you	find	the	joke	funny,	you	cannot	help	laughing	at	it.	Your	representation	of	the	situation	described	by	the	joke	seamlessly	leads	to	amusement	at	the	joke.	If	you	could	stop																																																									30	There	is	a	lively	debate	on	how	exactly	to	account	for	the	phenomenology	of	expert	perceptual	recognition.	Although	all	parties	agree	that	expertise	leads	to	a	change	in	the	
overall	phenomenal	character	of	one’s	visual	experience,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	how	best	to	explain	this	overall	phenomenal	change	(Siegel	2010).	My	talk	about	‘seamless	transitions’	is	intended	to	capture	the	uncontroversial	claim	that	the	way	we	move	from	perception	to	recognition	changes	with	expertise.	Experts	experience	those	transitions	as	phenomenally	seamless;	those	same	moves	strike	the	non-experts	as	having	gaps	that	must	be	sewn	together	by	bridge	principles.		
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somewhere	in	between,	you	did	not	get	the	joke	or	were	not	epistemically	permitted	to	laugh	at	it.	These	remarks	suggest	a	new	picture	of	the	way	emotions	provide	us	with	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties.	It	is	a	mistake	to	try	to	assign	the	responsibility	for	this	access	to	a	single	entity,	either	the	cognitive	basis	or	the	emotion.	Instead,	that	epistemic	access	is	a	joint	endeavor.	It	is	achieved	when	the	agent	moves	from	the	detection	of	the	trigger	of	the	emotional	disposition	to	some	action	tendencies.	Thus,	accessing	an	evaluative	property	is	not	passively	recognizing	a	property	of	the	intentional	object.	It	is	rather	a	transition	from	a	cognitive	basis	to	an	actualization	of	an	emotional	disposition.		I	have	developed	these	suggestions	by	reflecting	on	the	processes	that	lead	to	specific	emotional	responses.	This	might	seem	to	contradict	the	original	aim	of	dealing	with	propositional	justification.	Yet,	the	problem	is	just	apparent.	Indeed,	some	philosophers	hold	that	attitudinal	justification	is	more	fundamental	than	propositional	justification	(see	Goldman	1986,	for	the	priority	of	doxastic	justification	over	propositional	justification).	We	can	therefore	generalize	these	lessons	to	propositional	justification	by	formulating	a	counterfactual	analysis.	We	can	solve	the	gap	problem	as	follows:		
	 Basic	Emotional	Justification	If	a	subject	S’s	basic	emotion	E	about	an	object,	o,	is	justified,	then:	-	S	is	(or	seems	to	be)	aware	of	o	as	having	some	N-properties	F,	G,	H…	-	S	has	a	set	of	emotional	dispositions	that,	other	things	being	equal,	would	lead	her	to	move	from	the	detection	of	F,	G,	H…	to	the	corresponding	emotion	E.	
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-	If	the	emotional	response	were	to	occur,	S	would	experience	the	transition	from	the	cognitive	basis	to	the	emotion	as	a	phenomenologically	seamless	transition.			 It	is	worth	making	two	remarks	on	this	analysis.	First,	I	have	not	offered	
sufficient	conditions	for	emotional	justification.	The	reason	is	that	a	complete	account	of	emotional	justification	should	be	supplemented	with	a	theory	of	emotional	dispositions.	This	theory	should	be	further	tested	by	its	capacity	to	deal	with	defeaters,	‘barn’	cases,	and	similar	scenarios	that	have	been	discussed	in	the	epistemological	literature.	I	will	say	something	about	this	program	in	the	next	section.	Second,	Deonna	and	Teroni	(2012:	104–17)	have	offered	a	battery	of	arguments	to	the	effect	that	dispositions	such	as	moods,	sentiments,	and	character	traits	do	not	positively	contribute	to	the	justification	of	emotions.	These	arguments	deserve	to	be	examined.	Unfortunately,	I	do	not	have	sufficient	space	to	discuss	them	here.	I	will	rather	spend	some	time	responding	to	some	specific	objections	to	the	current	approach.			
6. Objections	and	Replies	
	
Objection	1:	It	could	be	objected	that	the	dispositional	view	is	not	an	alternative	to	inferentialism	but	rather	a	version	of	it.	Indeed,	one	might	claim	that,	even	if	an	emotional	response	is	grounded	in	a	corresponding	emotional	disposition,	the	subject	still	needs	antecedent	justification	to	believe	a	bridge	proposition	of	the	form:	N-properties	F,	G,	H…	constitute	the	formal	object	of	emotion	E	in	the	current	circumstances.	
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Reply:	This	objection	would	lead	us	back	to	value	skepticism	(Section	4).	I	have	assumed	that	value	skepticism	is	not	a	desirable	position.	Still,	my	goal	was	not	the	ambitious	one	of	refuting	value	skepticism	but	rather	the	modest	one	of	sketching	an	account	of	emotional	justification	that	does	not	have	skeptical	consequences.	And	inferentialism	has	skeptical	consequences.	Thus,	our	question	is:	Are	there	reasonable	grounds	to	think	that	the	dispositional	account	does	not	have	skeptical	consequences?	My	answer	is	‘yes’.	Indeed,	a	generalized	form	of	inferentialism	would	lead	to	a	highly	unstable	position.	To	begin	with,	notice	that	there	are	plenty	of	ampliative	transitions	in	our	mental	life	that	are	not	plausibly	construed	along	inferential	lines.	Yet,	we	have	the	strong	intuition	that	those	ampliative	transitions	are	epistemically	permissible.	If	you	see	a	red	square	and	a	blue	circle,	your	visual	system	moved	from	sensory	states	that	detect	redness,	squareness,	blueness,	and	circularity	to	other	sensory	states	that	represent	a	red	square	and	a	blue	circle.	This	transition	is	ampliative	because	your	visual	system	had	to	go	beyond	the	deliverances	of	feature	detectors.	After	all,	the	detection	of	redness,	squareness,	blueness,	and	circularity	could	correspond	to	a	scene	containing	a	blue	square	and	a	red	circle	or	a	scene	containing	four	scattered	properties.	Still,	this	transition	strikes	most	non-skeptics	as	epistemically	permissible.	Crucially,	it	is	implausible	to	hold	that	taking	the	binding	of	these	features	at	face	value	is	justified	because	we	have	antecedent	justification	to	believe	a	background	proposition,	as	the	inferential	model	would	predict.	A	more	plausible	hypothesis	is	that	we	are	endowed	with	dispositions	to	bind	different	features	into	object	representations.	If	we	do	not	posit	these	dispositions,	we	will	be	led	to	the	troubling	conclusion	that	even	primitive	perceptual	propositions	such	as	<This	is	a	red	square>	cannot	be	epistemically	justified	by	perception	alone.	
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After	all,	it	is	unclear	how	the	proposition	<This	square	goes	together	with	that	instance	of	redness>	could	be	epistemically	justified.	My	suggestion	is	that	something	similar	holds	for	basic	emotions.	Emotions	such	as	fear	have	correctness	conditions	that	feature	formal	objects.	Basic	emotions	are	partly	justified	by	basic	dispositions	to	bind	those	formal	objects	to	their	intentional	objects.	These	basic	dispositions	are	triggered	by	non-evaluative	properties	that	bear	salient	relations	to	the	emotions’	intentional	object.31	
Objection	2:	Some	readers	might	protest	that	the	dispositional	account	faces	a	circularity	problem.	Indeed,	one	might	contend	that	our	understanding	of	emotional	dispositions	is	parasitic	on	our	understanding	of	emotional	episodes.	To	illustrate,	the	emotional	disposition	that	grounds	fear	is	to	be	understood	as	a	disposition	to	feel	fear	in	dangerous	situations.	Thus,	it	is	a	mistake	to	hold	that	fear	is	grounded	in	an	emotional	disposition.		
Reply:	I	can	grant	that	our	understanding	of	emotional	dispositions	is	parasitic	on	our	understanding	of	emotional	episodes.	Yet,	this	does	not	prevent	the	dispositional	view	from	offering	an	informative	account	of	emotional	justification.	Indeed,	it	is	possible	to	characterize	emotional	dispositions	in	ways	that	go	beyond	specific	emotional	episodes,	and	these	characterizations	are	epistemically	significant.	Thus,	Mulligan	(1998:	163)	suggests	that	sentiments	“fix	the	range	of	variation	of	a	subject’s”	emotional	responses.32	Similarly,	Roberts	(2003:	142)	describes	the	broader	category	of	a	concern	“as	a	principle	of	predilection	of	a	range	of	widely	various	emotional	responses”.	Thus,	one	might	think	of	emotional	dispositions	as	providing	templates	that	determine	the	ways	in	
																																																								31	This	is	a	very	special	kind	of	binding.	In	my	view,	it	is	phenomenologically	realized	in	our	experience	of	action	tendencies.	I	leave	this	issue	for	another	occasion.		32	Mulligan	(1998)	does	not	construe	sentiments	as	bases	of	emotions	but	as	bases	of	intentions	and	wantings.	Thus,	his	view	faces	the	gap	problem.	
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which	a	subject	would	react	to	some	types	of	events	or	situations.	An	epistemological	theory	of	emotional	dispositions	could	therefore	examine	the	conditions	under	which	these	templates	are	epistemically	good	or	bad.	It	is	obvious	that	some	emotional	dispositions	are	epistemically	bad.	Love	often	leads	to	unwarranted	admiration	and	being	timid	often	leads	to	feel	fear	of	inoffensive	objects	and	situations.	A	theory	of	emotional	justification	could	therefore	identify	commonalities	between	these	templates	and	use	them	to	identify	the	conditions	under	which	an	emotional	disposition	is	epistemically	good	or	bad.	It	could	also	describe	some	general	features	of	the	acquisition	of	emotional	dispositions	by	evolution,	habit	or	education.	Presumably,	some	modes	of	acquisition	may	negatively	or	positively	affect	emotional	justification.33		
Objection	3:	Some	readers	might	complain	that	the	dispositional	account	faces	a	problem	analogous	to	a	famous	problem	faced	by	psychological	behaviorism.	Arguably,	it	is	not	always	possible	to	specify	the	triggering	conditions	of	emotional	dispositions	in	non-evaluative	terms.	
Reply:	I	do	not	claim	that	the	triggering	conditions	of	all	emotional	dispositions	can	be	specified	in	non-evaluative	terms.	Indeed,	some	of	them	may	be	based	on	representations	with	evaluative	contents.	As	an	illustration,	many	people	have	experienced	indignation	at	Donald	Trump’s	election	because	they	judge	him	to	be	unworthy	of	being	the	US	president.	More	generally,	many	emotions	can	be	based	on	judgments	of	value.	My	point	is	rather	that	the	triggering	conditions	of	several	emotional	dispositions	can	be	specified	in	non-evaluative	terms.	This	is	all	we	need	to	avoid	value	skepticism	while	dispelling	some	of	the	mystery	that	surrounds	our	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties.	The	case	of																																																									33	Virtue	epistemology	would	be	a	natural	starting	point	to	pursue	these	inquiries.	I	think	that	current	accounts	of	epistemic	and	moral	virtues	will	benefit	from	a	closer	examination	of	emotional	justification.	
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the	gorilla	is	a	representative	example	of	this	idea.	Once	we	think	about	the	structure	of	this	case,	it	is	not	difficult	to	come	up	with	many	other	examples.	A	rat’s	fear	of	an	imminent	electroshock	can	be	keyed	to	its	hearing	of	a	beep,	which	is	specifiable	in	non-evaluative	terms.	An	animal’s	fear	and	avoidance	responses	can	be	keyed	to	the	colors	of	poisonous	substances.	Similarly,	episodes	of	grief	and	longing	can	be	triggered	by	the	perceptual	recognition	of	the	beloved’s	belongings,	which	do	not	need	to	be	described	in	evaluative	terms;	they	are	just	tightly	associated	with	the	beloved	one.		
	
7. Concluding	Remarks		 The	simple	view	of	emotional	justification	holds	that	the	justification	of	some	emotions	supervenes	on	the	content	of	their	cognitive	bases	alone.	I	introduced	a	series	of	epistemological	distinctions	to	clarify	the	scope	of	the	simple	view.	The	simple	view	is	most	plausibly	construed	as	an	account	of	immediate	propositional	justification	understood	as	epistemic	permissibility.	This	restricted	thesis	faces	the	gap	problem:	If	there	is	a	difference	in	the	ways	cognitive	bases	represent	objects	and	properties	and	the	ways	the	emotions	(re)present	the	evaluative	properties	of	those	objects,	the	simple	view	has	failed	to	provide	sufficient	conditions	for	emotional	justification.	I	considered	various	ways	of	solving	the	gap	problem	and	found	them	wanting.	The	purported	solutions	either	lead	to	value	skepticism,	or	contradict	cognitivism,	or	are	not	sufficiently	illuminating.		One	might	solve	the	gap	problem	by	rejecting	cognitivism	or	the	claim	that	emotions	are	grounded	in	other	mental	states	or	episodes.	I	proposed	a	more	conservative	view.	I	preserved	the	intuition	that	some	emotions	are	more	
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immediately	justified	than	others	by	introducing	a	dispositional	model	of	our	access	to	evaluative	properties.	On	this	view,	subjects	have	emotional	dispositions	that,	in	conjunction	with	the	contents	of	emotions’	cognitive	bases,	can	confer	immediate	emotional	justification.	Emotional	dispositions	explain	how	one	can	have	epistemic	access	to	evaluative	properties	without	being	able	to	literally	detect	those	evaluative	properties.	They	also	explain	why	emotional	responses	seem	to	be	permissible	from	the	first-person	perspective.		It	is	an	open	question	how,	on	the	proposed	account,	emotions	contribute	to	the	justification	of	evaluative	judgments.	This	is	a	difficult	issue	that	should	be	tackled	by	analyzing	the	representational	structure	of	emotions.	It	is	worth	stressing,	however,	that	the	proposed	account	offers	a	contribution	of	broader	interest	to	epistemology:	it	provides	a	series	of	cases	in	which	immediate	justification	does	not	require	that	the	representational	content	of	the	justifier	mental	state	be	identical	to	the	content	of	the	justified	mental	state	or	episode.	Thus,	philosophers	interested	in	the	scope	of	immediate	justification	should	pay	closer	attention	to	the	epistemology	of	emotions.34		 																																																									34	I	am	extremely	grateful	to	Julien	Deonna	and	Fabrice	Teroni	for	helping	me	find	my	way	through	the	intricate	literature	on	emotions.	Special	thanks	are	due	to	the	participants	at	the	workshop	Experience,	Values,	and	Justification	(Geneva,	2-3	June	2016)	for	their	probing	questions	and	remarks,	especially	to	Berit	Brogaard,	Elijah	Chudnoff,	David	Faraci,	Karen	Jones,	Federico	Lauria,	Moritz	Müller,	and	Peter	Railton.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	Richard	Dub	for	several	stimulating	conversations	on	the	emotions,	Arturs	Logins	for	advice	on	epistemic	matters,	and	Tristram	Oliver-Skuse,	who	kindly	sent	me	his	excellent	dissertation	and	made	detailed	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.	I	presented	a	subsequent	version	of	this	article	at	the	Institut	Jean	Nicod	(November	9,	2016).	Many	thanks	to	Jöelle	Proust,	Paul	Egré,	and	their	students	for	their	objections	and	remarks.	A	nearly	final	version	of	this	article	was	also	discussed	at	Susanna	Schellenberg’s	research	seminar	at	Rutgers	University.	I	am	grateful	to	Susanna	and	her	students	for	their	suggestions	of	improvement.	Finally,	I	would	like	to	thank	the	Swiss	Center	for	Affective	Sciences	(NCCR)	and	Thumos:	The	Genevan	Research	Group	on	Emotions,	Values,	and	Norms	at	the	University	of	Geneva	for	providing	an	ideal	research	environment	while	I	was	preparing	this	manuscript.	Work	on	this	project	was	funded	by	a	generous	grant	from	the	Swiss	National	Science	Foundation	(FNS	100012_150265/1).	
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